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Predictive processing, perceptual presence, and sensorimotor theory 
J. Kevin O’Regan & Jan Degenaar 
 
Abstract 
Mastery of sensorimotor contingencies can be viewed as attunement to potentialities. In our 
view, these potentialities have wider application than recognized in Seth’s account of sensory 
presence, and should pertain to all of sensory experience. Instead of appealing only to a 
notion of counterfactual richness, we propose that the degree of sensory presence can be 
further specified in terms of bodiliness, insubordinateness, and grabbiness. While PPSMC can 
provide a possible implementation of a sensorimotor account of synesthesia, we suggest it 
should be rid of its representationalist interpretation. 
 
Seth’s PPSMC theory offers an interesting hypothesis on the neural processes involved in the 
mastery of sensorimotor contingencies. Importantly, Seth and we agree that this mastery, 
which guarantees the feel of really perceiving, must involve being attuned to (or having 
implicit knowledge of) not just actual, but additionally, potential sensorimotor contingencies. 
It is this attunement to potentiality which in Seth’s account corresponds to access to 
counterfactuals, and which in our sensorimotor approach corresponds partly to what we call 
“mastery” of sensorimotor contingencies. 
But it would seem that Seth’s appeal to counterfactuals is exclusively used in an account of 
sensory presence, whereas in the sensorimotor theory, counterfactuals (or more precisely, 
potential sensorimotor contingencies) are necessarily involved in all perceptual experience. 
For example, under the sensorimotor theory, to perceive a patch as red is to be attuned to the 
retinal changes that would occur if one were to move the patch around under different 
illuminations (cf. O’Regan, 2011 O’Regan, J. K. (2011). Why red doesn’t sound like a bell: 
Understanding the feel of consciousness. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; Philipona 
& O’Regan, 2006Philipona, D. L., & O’Regan, J. K.(2006). Color naming, unique hues, and 
hue cancellation predicted from singularities in reflection properties. Visual Neuroscience, 
23(3–4), 331–339. doi:10.1017/S0952523806233182; Vazquez-Corral, O’Regan, Vanrell, & 
Finlayson, 2012Vazquez-Corral, J., O’Regan, J. K., Vanrell, M., & Finlayson, G. D.(2012). A 
new spectrally sharpened sensor basis to predict color naming, unique hues, and hue 
cancellation. Journal of Vision, 12(6). doi:10.1167/12.6.7 ). Thus, our claim would be that the 
experience of concurrent redness in synesthesia would also require counterfactual 
sensorimotor contingencies of red to hold: Otherwise there would be no experience of red. 
To account for the lesser perceptual presence of concurrent experiences in synesthesia, Seth 
appeals to lesser counterfactual richness. But to pinpoint what causes perceptual presence or 
its lack, we would go further than appealing to the degree of richness. The experienced 
sensory presence or phenomenality of sensory experience is governed by three particular 
characteristics of sensorimotor contingencies, namely what we call bodiliness, 
insubordinateness, and grabbiness (e.g., O’Regan, 2011O’Regan, J. K. (2011). Why red 
doesn’t sound like a bell: Understanding the feel of consciousness. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press; O’Regan, Myin, & Noë, 2005a,b O’Regan, J. K., Myin, E., 
& Noë, A.(2005b). Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of ‘corporality’ and 
‘alerting capacity’. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(4), 369–387. 
doi:10.1007/s11097-005-9000-0). These are objective facts about sensorimotor contingencies 
that guarantee that they actually correspond to real-world interactions. Using bodiliness, 
insubordinateness, and grabbiness, we can begin to make a classification that predicts the 
degree of sensory presence, going from thinking and memory, through imagining, dreaming, 
emotions, pain, and socially determined states like pride and embarrassment, and including 
visceral states, proprioception, and vestibular processes, up to sensations provided by the five 
classic sense modalities of seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting—these latter being 
those that are considered as having the highest degree of properly sensory presence. 
Bodiliness, insubordinateness, and grabbiness provide greater leverage in comparing and 
contrasting degrees of perceptual presence than appealing to the generic notion of richness of 
counterfactuals. For example, these concepts help to explain why visceral sensory systems, 
proprioception, and the vestibular sense, do not have obvious sensory presence, even though 
they presumably involve brain systems with hierarchical global models and predictive 
processing just like the five classic senses. We suspect that PPSMC’s explanation would be 
more ad hoc. 
Another comment concerns how the sensorimotor account and PPSMC deal with synesthesia. 
In our view, sensorimotor theory itself already has the resources to explain synesthesia and its 
resistance to adaptation. The fact that, as Seth notes, the experience of a synesthetic 
concurrent “seems to have little to do with the SMCs underwriting the perception of the 
inducer,” presents no more of a challenge to sensorimotor theory than the fact that we can 
vividly imagine things that are absent. Once one has mastery over the sensorimotor 
dependencies of red, the experience of red can potentially be evoked in an atypical way. 
Perhaps because the relevant cortical activity is “dangling” semi-independently of the present 
sensorimotor engagement (Hurley & Noë, 2003Hurley, S., & Noë, A. (2003). Neural 
plasticity and consciousness. Biology and Philosophy, 18(1), 131–168. 
doi:10.1023/A:1023308401356), or because of other (possibly genetic) factors counteracting 
neural plasticity, synesthesia may then not adapt away through interaction with the 
environment. 
PPSMC essentially provides a possible neural implementation of these ideas. It proposes that 
synesthesia may have something to do with “intermediate level generative models,” 
speculating that these “are endowed with unusually high prior precision weighting so that 
these priors overwhelm concurrent-related sensory prediction errors flowing from lower 
levels.” This may be one way to be “dangling” or to otherwise counteract plasticity. Of 
course, whether this way is in fact instantiated in synesthetes requires neuroscientific 
evidence, and Seth’s account does the service that it may help to look for such evidence. 
A final comment concerns the notion of representation in the PPSMC model. While Seth 
speaks of representational models of external causes, we would reject such a representational 
interpretation. We have no objection to saying that from the scientist’s outside perspective 
there may exist brain processes that can be viewed as hierarchically organized, with one layer 
functioning as if it “predicts” the activity of a lower layer. But this should not be taken to say 
that the higher levels represent external causes. 
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